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Abstract-The municipal overburden hypothesis asserts the existence of a causal relationship between 
high levels of non-school municipal expenditure or tax rates and low levels of school spending. We 
estimate demand for expenditure on education using a median voter model. The hypothesis is tested by 
including in the estimating eauation several versions of a variable representing municipal overhurden. 
We find-no evidence in scppbrt of the hypothesis 
INTRODUCTION 
THE CON(‘EPT of “municipal overburden” is a 
response to concern that large cities cannot 
adequately finance their schools. It hypothesizes a 
causal relationship between high levels of non- 
school municipal expenditure or high tax rates and 
low levels of school spending. 
The municipal overburden (“m/o”) argument has 
two premises: first, that cities have characteristics 
such as high population density, aged housing stock, 
and large concentrations of low income, un- 
employed, aged, and minority populations that lead 
mexorably to high levels of spending for municipal 
services, and second that there is a fixed fund from 
which both school and municipal services must be 
financed. It then claims that spending on education 
In large cities is relatively low because of un- 
.lvoidably high levels of spending on municipal 
5ervices. 
The m/o hypothesis has been invoked in a number 
of challenges to the constitutionality of state systems 
of school finance, particularly in New Jersey, New 
York, and Maryland. Our review of the relevant 
case materials leaves us with the impression that the 
c,oncept has gained something close to general 
acceptance in New Jersey, at least considerable 
[respect in New York, and has not been rejected in 
Maryland. It appears to be established as a legit- 
rmate cause of action in suits challenging the 
constitutionality of state-local systems of financing 
schools.’ Debate in these cases has not had the 
benefit of adequate empirical evidence or economic 
analysis. Our objective is to provide these. 
THE DEMAND FOR EDUCATION 
The Choice Model 
To test the validity of the m/o hypothesis, we need 
to determine whether or not the requirements of 
financing municipal services systematically affect the 
level of education expenditure. To do this. we first 
need to give a full account of how a community 
chooses the quantity of education it consumes given 
its preferences, demographic characteristics. and 
fiscal circumstances. If m/o exists, then we should be 
able to show that it affects this choice, or in other 
words, that a measure of m/o is an important 
determinant of the demand for education. 
The first difficulty we encounter in estimating the 
demand for education is in defining our dependent 
variable, “quantity of education”. Education is both 
a private and a social good, and for the individual it 
is both a consumption and an investment good. 
Being so difficult to define, it is. of course, im- 
possible to measure in terms of physical units. We 
proceed by using “dollars per pupil of expenditure 
on current account” as our proxy for the quantity of 
units of educational output.’ 
*To whom corrcspondcnce should he addressed at: 760 Woodlawn. Jackson, MI 49203, U.S.A. [Manuscript rcceivcd 
.;O January 19X6; revision accepted for publication 27 April 19X6.1 
353 
354 Economics of Education Review 
Next we model the process by which a community 
chooses the quantity and mix of local public goods 
that it wishes to consume. We can imagine a 
spectrum of possible decision-making processes 
ranging from absolute dictatorship to fully func- 
tional representative democracy. We assume that 
the latter is the appropriate model for our study. In 
particular, we assume that the median voter, or the 
voter with median income, age, education, property 
value owned, and so forth, is the decisive voter. We 
expect that the quantity of education supplied in 
each school district will be equal to the median 
quantity demanded in that district.’ The con- 
venience and appeal of this model stem from the fact 
that it may, as a large group of studies that have 
used it attest, provide a good approximation to the 
way things are, and it readily lends itself to empirical 
estimation. We can estimate the demand equation 
using readily available data relating to the median 
voter in each community in our sample. 
In our model the median voter is a rational actor 
whose behavior is designed to maximize his utility 
given his preference function, the prices he faces, 
and his income. Not only does he always vote, but 
his votes are cast in such a way as to be consistent 
with his utility maximizing behavior over all goods, 
public and private. As is commonly done, we 
assume that his demand for public goods can be 
characterized using a log-linear demand function: 
In ED = In A + cx In P, + l3 In P, + y In Y 
+ csi In zi + E 
where P, is the price of education, P,, is the price of 
other local public goods, Y is median income, Z is a 
vector of community characteristics that are thought 
to influence the median voter’s decisions, and F is 
an error term with mean of zero. The coefficients in 
this equation (u. l3, y, 6,) tell us the sensitivity of 
expenditure with respect to each of its determinants. 
Defining the Determinants of Demand 
Important determinants of demand for any good 
include price, income, and the prices of other goods. 
A local public good does not have a price in the 
sense that a private consumption good has a market 
price. Instead, we presume that the median voter is 
cognizant of a “tax price”, which is the cost to him in 
additional tax paid of an increase of one dollar in the 
level of expenditure per pupil (or per capita in the 
case of municipal services). Tax price is a function of 
the median voter’s “tax share”, or the ratio of the 
value of his tax base to the community’s tax base. It 
is also affected by the presence of state or federal 
matching aid, and by deductibility of property taxes 
for those who itemize deductions on their federal 
and state income tax returns. The median voter’s tax 
price is entirely independent of his preferences with 
respect to local public goods and the level of 
expenditure on those goods. 
Ideally we would include measures of the prices of 
local non-school goods and of private goods. These 
prices could affect demand for education to what- 
ever extent these goods might be substitutes or 
complements of education. Unfortunately we have 
not been able to devise a measure for the price of 
private goods, or one for local non-school public 
goods that is sufficiently different from tax price for 
education. 
Our measure of income is comparatively straight- 
forward: median family income (Y). 
Lump-sum aid to education affects the median 
voter by, in effect, extending his budget constraint.” 
We account for the share of this aid implicitly 
received by the median voter by multiplying the 
total amount received under each of the classes of 
grants by his tax share.’ In this way, each class of 
lump-sum grant may be viewed as an increase in the 
median voter’s income equal to the amount by 
which the taxes he pays could be reduced without 
cutting expenditures below the level that would have 
obtained in the absence of the lump sum grants. 
The median voter in each community does not 
function in a vacuum. Rather, he is subject to a 
variety of influences that may be grouped under the 
general head of “community characteristics”. They 
include such factors as the proportion of the 
population that is over age 64 (AGED), the propor- 
tion of residences that are owner occupied (OOC), 
party preference of the voters (VOTE), the in- 
cidence of poverty (POVT), and the proportion of 
the adult population that has never finished high 
school (NOHS). We expect that Democrats, tra- 
ditionally the more liberal spenders, will exert their 
influence toward higher expenditures for education; 
but older people, owner occupants, the poor, and 
those with less than a high school education are all 
expected to prefer lower outlays for education and 
to affect, in turn, the preferences of the median 
voter. 
The amounts that are spent for education per 
pupil are likely also to be influenced by some aspects 
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of the schools themselves. We discuss these in the 
section entitled “Empirical Results”. 
THE INFLUENCE OF MUNICIPAL 
OVERBURDEN 
To test for the influence of m/o on the demand for 
education we will successively enter several 
measures of m/o into our demand equation. We 
have selected measures that are representative of 
the wide variety of definitions of m/o that appear in 
the literature. 
Our first measure of m/o is simply the municipal 
tax rate (MTXRT). This variant reflects the form in 
which the State of Michigan has recognized m/o in 
supplementing state aid for education. The m/o 
argument holds that a high non-school tax rate 
reduces the tax rate levied for schools and, there- 
fore, education expenditures. We then test the ratio 
of municipal to total (municipal plus school) tax 
rates (TRATIO).” 
It is sometimes claimed that high municipal 
expenditures as such constitute a measure of m/o. 
But expenditures do not in themselves burden 
taxpayers or voters. They are financed out of state 
and federal aid and non-tax revenues such as user 
charges, fees, fines, and licenses, as well as taxes, 
.md it is most unlikely that any of these other than 
faxes can be seen as impinging on school financing 
.my more than does any other voluntarily under- 
taken disposition of income. It seems to us that the 
measure of expenditures for municipal purposes that 
!s relevant in this context is tax-financed expen- 
ditures per capita (TFEXP).’ 
A variant of this theme that may be appropriate 
t’or testing the m/o hypothesis is the ratio of tax- 
financed expenditures to personal income 
(TFYRTO). This variable provides a measure of the 
relative burden imposed by local taxes for municipal 
purposes. 
The measures of m/o used in these first four tests 
are likely to be determined by many of the same 
Influences that determine educational expenditures. 
To account for this, we conduct these tests using 
two-stage least squares (2SLS) rather than ordinary 
least squares (OLS).’ 
Even when expenditures are reduced to the level 
tinanced by local taxation they continue to reflect 
the influences of income, price, and tastes or 
1)references. They reflect only in part, perhaps only 
in small part, circumstances giving rise to differences 
in “need”. By “need” we mean a level of expendi- 
tures that is independent of income (including 
The last of our m/o tests involves substituting 
federal and state aid), price, and preferences; it is a 
function simply of the other characteristics of the 
income less “need” for median family income, to 
community that govern demand for municipal 
services, such as population density, the incidence of 
give us a variable that may be defined as a form of 
poverty, aged housing and people, and so forth. To 
estimate “need” 
disposable income, “disposable” in the sense that 
(NEED) we first estimate a 
demand equation for municipal operating expen- 
municipal “needs” have been deducted. If the m/o 
ditures,” 
argument is to gain support through this approach 
then using the sample means for price, 
income, aid, and our proxies for preferences, we 
calculate NEED for each community. 
the equation containing YNEED in lieu of Y 
(median family income) should enable us to better 
explain the determinants of expenditure.“’ 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
We have estimated our expenditure demand 
equations by performing regression analysis on 
samples of school districts from three states, 
Connecticut. New Jersey, and Virginia.” This tech- 
nique reveals the degree to which each variable can 
be said to influence demand. 
The results of our analysis, which are presented in 
Table 1, tend to be supportive of the median voter 
model. The elasticities generally have the expected 
sign and are within the range suggested by earlier 
studies (e.g. Lovell, 1078) and theoretical consider- 
ations.‘* The overall fit of the regressions is good, as 
is indicated by the corrected values of R’ that range 
from 0.55 for New Jersey to 0.77 for Connecticut.‘3 
The elasticity of tax price is consistently negative. 
Its value of -0.14 in New Jersey, while clearly 
statistically significant, implies a high degree of 
insensitivity of demand to differences in price.” 
This is much less true in Connecticut and Virginia, 
where the coefficients are -0.32 and -0.28. 
The level of family income plays a major role in 
the demand for education. The elasticities of 
demand with respect to income are 0.62 (Con- 
necticut), 0.32 (New Jersey), and 0.43 (Virginia). 
This means that an increase of $1 in income in each 
of the three states would be associated with an 
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Notes: (1) Standard errors appear in parentheses. (2) All regression equations are 
in log-linear form. (3) Coefficients marked with a dagger (t) arc significant at the 
5% level, and those marked with an asterisk (*) are significant at the 1% level. 
increase in per pupil expenditures of $0.06 in income for the median voter equal to total aid times 
Connecticut, $0.04 in New Jersey, and $0.06 in his tax share. The elasticity with respect to basic aid 
Virginia.” is not significantly different from zero in any of our 
Recall that, in our model, lump-sum federal and states. We expect categorical or earmarked aid to 
state aid for education is equivalent to an increase in have a substantially larger effect on expenditure 
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than unrestricted aid as it often supports mandated 
programs on which districts would otherwise spend 
nothing. Our results support this theory, although 
<omewhat tentatively, in that some of the relevant 
coefficients are not quite significant at the 5% level. 
Of the community characteristics that we have 
included among our explanatory variables, the 
percentage of owner-occupied housing (OCC) 
stands out as being the most consistently significant 
across states, suggesting that owner-occupiers 
prefer to spend less on public services than renters 
do. other things equal. The coefficients of our other 
measures of voter preferences, the proportion of the 
;tdult population that did not attend high school 
INOHS) and the proportion of Democratic voters 
IVOTE), are consistently negative and positive 
respectively and significant in Connecticut and New 
lersey. Neither is significant in Virginia. 
Our results do not support the view that the 
presence of a large elderly population (AGED) 
tends to depress spending on education. Similarly, 
poverty (POVT) does not seem to affect spending.” 
We can draw some genera1 conclusions about the 
Isffects of school characteristics, although these 
findings are not always supported by statistically 
significant coefficients in all three states. Higher 
I ates or’ enrollment growth (ENRGR) generally are 
:tssociated with lower spending. The effect of district 
size (PUP and PUPSQ) is non-linear: per pupil 
expenditures fall and then rise as enrollment grows. 
The presence of non-resident pupils (NONRS), the 
proportion of pupils sent to school in other districts 
(SENT), the proportion of pupils in high school 
(SECPUP), the fraction of pupils who are enrolled 
in non-public schools (PRIV), and the number of 
pupils per family (PUPFM) do not appear to have a 
systematic influence on expenditure. Finally, in New 
Jersey, membership in a regional high school district 
(MEMB) lowers spending, while our test of the 
effect of a district’s status as dependent (part of a 
municipal government) or independent (DEPDIST) 
is inconclusive. 
In spite of our finding that several variables, most 
notably price and income, explain a large part of the 
variance in expenditure in each of our states,” 
unexplained variance ranging from 40% in New 
Jersey to 20% in Connecticut remains. We are left, 
then, knowing that factors we have not considered 
also influence expenditure on education. We now 
turn to our tests of the influence of mio to see if it 
might be one of these. 
Results of the Municipal Overburden Tests 
We have tested each of the six versions of the m/o 
hypothesis outlined above by including it in our 
estimation equation for education expenditure. 
Resuits of these tests are presented in Table 2. 
(Tabies reporting the coefficients for all variables in 
these six regressions are available from the authors 
upon request.) 










Connecticut New Jersey Virginia 
Parameter Parameter Parameter 
estimate R’ estimate R2 estimate ii” 
~I______-_ 
-0.082 0.096 0.12 
(0.073) 0.74 (0.054) 0.53 (0.10) 0.69 
-0.12 0.22 0.19 
(0.15) 0.74 (0.13) 0.47 (0.16) 0.55 
-0.24 -0.12 -0.23 
(0.27) 0.49 (0.095) 0.46 (0.075) 0.70 
-0.16 -0.11 0.036 
(0.18) 0.62 (0. IO) 0.47 (0.073) 0.74 
-0.21 0.17 0.0661 
$:_$ 
0.78 (0.13) 0.55 
0.25” (Xj,“3) 
0.73 
(0.12) 0.77 (0.054) 0.54 (0.15) 0.73 
Notes: (1) Standard errors appear in parentheses. (2) All regression equations are in log-linear form. (3) Coefficients 
marked with a dagger (i) are significant at the 5% level, and those marked with an asterisk (*) are significant at the 1% 
level. 
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In the first five tests, if the coefficient for our m/o 
test variable were negative and statistically signifi- 
cant, we would have some evidence that m/o 
influences expenditure on education. However, the 
only coefficient that is statistically significant is 
positive rather than negative. Those that are nega- 
tive are not statistically distinguishable from zero. In 
the sixth test, in which income minus “need” is 
substituted for median family income, we find that 
this measure of “disposable income” does not 
explain expenditure better than income does. If it 
did, we would expect our measure of the extent to 
which variance in expenditure is explained, 
corrected R2, to rise. Thus none of our tests is able 
to support the m/o hypothesis. 
ON THE ECONOMICS OF MUNICIPAL 
OVERBURDEN 
Our efforts to find evidence supportive of the m/o 
hypothesis come up quite empty. A hypothesis that 
seems quite reasonable on its face simply fails our 
empirical tests. There are several plausible expla- 
nations for this finding. 
First, the tax cost of municipal non-school services 
amounts only to an average of 2.8% of personal 
income in Connecticut, 3% in New Jersey, and 2% 
in Virginia. Furthermore, much of these proportions 
of income may be borne or may be perceived as 
being borne by non-residents who own or are 
customers of a community’s industrial and commer- 
cial properties. Even large variance, between, say, 1 
and 6% of income, is unlikely to appreciably 
influence the demand for any one category of goods, 
including education. 
To see why this must be so, suppose that local 
financing of non-school services reduces disposable 
income by the amount spent,‘s and that the income 
elasticity of demand for education is 1.19 Then, if 
3% of income is spent for municipal services, 
expenditures for schools would be 3% lower than 
they would have been in the absence of expenditures 
for those services. Alternatively, if one municipality 
spends 1% of income on non-school services while 
another spends 6%, a range unlikely to be seen 
often, the effect on school expenditures would be to 
produce a difference between the two districts, 
other things equal, of only 5%, hardly enough to 
warrant the kinds of conclusions judges have drawn 
in Maryland, New Jersey, and New York. 
A second relevant observation is the fact that 
demand for municipal services and demand for 
education are influenced by much the same factors, 
so that where the demand for the one is high the 
demand for the other is also likely to be high. In 
fact, we find that the simple correlation coefficients 
between municipal and education expenditure are 
positive: 0.60 for Connecticut, 0.26 for New Jersey, 
and 0.70 for Virginia. 
It is also worth noting that the presence of 
relatively high municipal (non-school) expenditures 
in large cities does not necessarily constitute evi- 
dence that those expenditures are burdensome. 
Some urban public services may be alternatives to 
private purchase in a rural area of garbage disposal. 
trash collection, sewage removal, or fire and police 
protection. A person who pays much more for 
police and fire protection because she chooses to 
live in close proximity to her neighbors in the city is 
not necessarily worse off, or less willing or able to 
pay school taxes, than the one who pays for an equal 
probability of being subject to crime or fire in the 
costs of commuting to the city from her sparsely 
populated rural residence (Brazer et al., 1971). 
Furthermore, municipal expenditure in large 
cities is offset by intergovernmental grants and user 
charges to a larger extent than in other com- 
munities. The level of tax-financed expenditure in 
large cities is not nearly as high relative to that of 
other communities as is the level of total municipal 
expenditure. This makes the finding that municipal 
expenditure is not more “burdensome” in cities even 
less surprising. 
It is our view, based on our findings, that the m/o 
hypothesis is not a valid or reasonable basis on 
which to rest the claim for special assistance for 
urban school districts. If stressed districts are to be 
helped, aid should be based on factors that are 
directly indicative of the underlying factors that give 
rise to fiscal stress. These may include incidence of 
children living in poverty, of children whose com- 
mand of the English language is below acceptable 
standards, level of family income, tax base per 
pupil, and other relevant indices of costs and fiscal 
capacity. We find that m/o is simply not a helpful 
concept in fact, however much it may appeal to 
“common sense.” 
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NOTES 
I. M/o has only been explicitly recognized by the legislature of one state, Michigan, where districts 
whose non-school tax rate exceeds 125% of the statewide average receive supplementary school aid. 
Several other states adjust state aid for high population density, low income, or large numbers of 
children living in poverty. These adjustments may in some cases reflect concern about m/o. 
2. This approach requires a rather bold assumption, that a one dollar purchase of inputs to the 
educational process produces equal quantities of output everywhere. Also, in dividing expenditure by 
enrollment, we assume that the number of pupils is not influenced by expenditure. 
3. For a discussion of the median voter model see Bergstrom and Goodman (1973). 
4. Minimum aid in Connecticut and New Jersey, and most general aid in Virginia, as well as federal 
and state categorical aid are of lump sum variety. Basic aid is matched in New Jersey, but it is the 
previous year’s expenditures that are subject to matching. Thus we believe that state aid does not 
directly influence the current year’s perceived tax price of education, and we therefore treat it as lump 
sum aid. 
5. The classes of grants as we have defined them are general or basic state aid (BASICAID), 
categorical state aid (STCATAlD), and federal aid (FEDAID). 
6. We do not include this because it seems to us to be a convincing articulation of the m/o concept, but 
rather because this version of the m/o hypothesis has been so often stated before the courts in recent 
litigation. See, for example, the opinion of Judge Ross in Somerset County Board of Education et al. 
v. David W. Hornbeck’ef al., Circuit Court of Baltimore, quoted in 295 Md. 597 (1983). 
7. Obviously TFEXP is identical to tax receipts. Thus an alternative way of viewing this variation of 
m/o is that it is the municipal tax level rather than the tax rate that impinges on expenditures for 
schools. 
8. To create instruments we have used variables that affect demand for municipal services but not 
demand for school expenditures: density, fraction of housing stock that is old, percentage of property 
value that is industrial, percentage of the population that is black, and the unemployment rate. We 
used a slightly different set of variables in each state. 
9. The Appendix outlines the procedure we use to estimate demand for municipal expenditure. 
10. It should be noted that NEED is expressed as “need” per capita, whereas YNEED is median family 
income less “need” per family. 
11. Our selection of these states was dictated in part by the fact that in these states school districts and 
municipalities are largely coterminous, and by a desire to achieve some degree of regional diversity. 
12. Because our demand equations have a log-linear form, the estimated coefficients tell us the 
percentage change in expenditure given a 1% change in the relevant variable, or the elasticity of 
expenditure with respect to that variable. 
13. This measure tells us the percentage of variance in expenditure across communities that our 
variables explain when taken together. 
14. If a coefficient is “statistically significant” at the 5 (l)% level, then we can be 95 (99)% certain that it 
is different from zero. 
15. We compute the absolute change in expenditure given a one unit change in income by multiplying 
the income elasticity by the ratio of the means of expenditure and income. 
16. The poverty coefficient is measuring the effect of poverty when other factors, including median 
family income, are held constant. 
17. Tax price and median family income by themselves account for 42% of total variance in demand for 
education in Connecticut, 19% in New Jersey, and 32% in Virginia. Community characteristics raise 
these proportions of variance explained by 27, 23 and 33 points, respectively, in the three states. 
18. This is, of course an extreme and unrealistic assumption, one that concedes everything to those who 
argue the “inexorability” of municipal expenditures. 
19. This is higher than most estimates of the income elasticity of demand we have seen. 
20. As in the case of the equation for the demand for education, we cannot include both P, and P, 
because they are so close in value and virtually identical in New Jersey and Virginia, where very little 
of aid for schools is matching aid. 
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21. Some studies have found the employment/resident ratio to he an important determinant of 
municipal expenditures in some states. We have tested this hypothesis using the ratio of the sum of 
manufacturing, retail trade, and service employees to resident population, and have not found a 
significant relationship in our sample. We also considered including the following variables: the 
percentage of the population that is black and Puerto Rican, the percentage of the population over 25 
that has no high school education, and the rate of population growth. We found that our results do not 
differ in any important way when these are included. We have no compelling theoretical reason to 
include them, so we have not. 
22. We include expenditures of the overlying county in New Jersey, allocating them on a per capita 
basis. However, in New Jersey, we were unable to compute TFEXP properly, so we used current 
expenditure less user charges (EXPNOCHG) in its place. In Connecticut the counties are of no fiscal 
consequence and are ignored, while in Virginia outside of the cities the county is the relevant local 
government, and the cities are independent of the counties. 
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APPENDIX. DEMAND FOR MUNICIPAL SERVICES 
Our main concerns in estimating the demand for municipal services are to obtain equations that will 
permit us to estimate “need” and to test the accuracy of one of the premises of the m/o argument: the 
h~othesis that such conditions as a high incidence of poverty, unemployment, older housing, and aged 
people, together with high population density give rise inexorably to high per cupira ex~nditures for 
non-school local public goods. 
Using the same methodological approach as we outlined in the case of the demand for education. we 
can specify the demand equation for municipal non-school expenditures in log-linear form as 
In E,, = In B f 5 In P, + n In P, + K In Y + IX, In Z, + n 
where P, is the price of municipal services, P, is the price of education,“’ Y is median family income. 
and Z is a vector of other variables, including state and federal aid (ASMNT and AFMNT, respectively) 
and relevant community characteristics, in particular DENS, AGED, OLDHSE, UNEMRT, and 
POVT. 
Our l&t of explanatory variables also includes dummy variables identifying communities that are 
central cities (CENCITY) and those that are located outside a Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area 
(NSMSA), as well as population size (POP), the proportion of residences that are owner occupied 
(OOC), and the proportion of votes cast for Democratic Party candidates (VOTE).” 
We estimate demand for municipal expenditure using two different forms of the dependent variable: 
total expenditure (CURREXP) and tax-financed expenditure (TFEXP). We use the latter in estimating 
NEED.” Results are presented in Table A. 
The results are generally quite consistent with those of other studies and with standard economic 
theory. Our equations ‘*explain” between 60 and almost 90”/0 of variance without much help from 
factors that are often said to raise expenditure inexorably such as population density, the rate of 
unemployment, high incidence of poverty and aged people, large proportions of aging housing. or being 
a central city. As in the case of education, the most important of the determinants of the expenditures of 
cities for local public goods are tax price, income, aid, and some proxies for voter preferences. 
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Notes: (1) Standard errors appear in parentheses. (2) All regression equations are in log-linear form. (3) Coefficients 
marked with a dagger (t) are significant at the 5% level, and those marked with an asterisk (*) are significant at the 1% 
Itvel. (4) We were unable to compute TFEXP properly for New Jersey, so we used EXPNOCG in its place. 
